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Some Game Theoretic Remarks on
Two-Player Generalized Cops and Robbers Games
Athanasios Kehagias and Georgios Konstantinidis
Abstract
In this paper we study the two-player generalized Cops and Robber (GCR) games
introduced by Bonato and MacGillivray. Our main goal is to present a full, self-contained
game theoretic analysis of such games.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a game theoretic analysis of the two-player Generalized Cops and
Robber (henceforth GCR) games introduced by Bonato and MacGillivray in [4]. GCR can be
understood as a general framework for pursuit games on graphs. We have two main goals.
First, while [4] presents a very broad and interesting generalization of the “classic” Cops
and Robbers (henceforth CR) game, it follows the tradition of the CR literature, which is
dominated by graph theoretic and combinatorial arguments but pays little attention to core
game theoretic concepts such as the payoff function, value of a game, optimal strategies etc.
Because we consider such concepts essential to the study of games (and in particular of pursuit
games on graphs), in the current paper we will try to bring them to the foreground.
Secondly, as we will argue in the sequel, eschewing the classic game theoretic analysis can
result in nonrigorous treatment of certain game aspects. Hence our second goal in using game
theoretic tools is to fill certain gaps which (we believe) exist in the analysis of both GCR games
[4] and even the classic CR game [7].
The “classic” CR game was introduced (independently) in [17] and [18, 19, 20] and has been
the subject of intense research ever since. A good and relatively recent review of the literature
appears in the excellent book [3] and additional references can be found in [5, 8]. As already
mentioned, Bonato and MacGillivray present in [4] a very broad generalization of the classic CR
game. The abovementioned reviews contain references to many of the CR “variants” which have
appeared in the literature. Almost all such works use a graph theoretic and/or combinatorial
approach; as far as we are aware, very few authors deal with the game theoretic aspects of both
classic CR and its variants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present definitions and notations
which will be used in the sequel. In Section 3 we solve the GCR game, i.e., we compute its
value and optimal strategies. We present two different solutions. The solution of Section 3.1 is
based on a vertex labeling (VL) algorithm which has been used in [4, 7]; we prove rigorously
that this algorithm computes the value and optimal strategies (in the game theoretic sense) of
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the GCR game; furthermore, this analysis is self-contained, i.e., all our claims are proved within
this paper. The solution of Section 3.2, on the other hand, first proves the existence of value
and afterwards shows that the value can be computed by the VL algorithm of Section 3.1; this
analysis is not self-contained; several classic Game Theoretic results are used, in particular the
Minimax Theorem [22]. In Section 4 we discuss the connection of previous analyses of both
GCR and classic CR to our own. Finally, we summarize and conclude in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Informal Description of the GCR Game
We first provide an informal description of the GCR game. This description is inspired by the
one given in [4] but, as will be explained, differs in several respects.
To motivate our description, first recall the basic elements of the classic CR game. CR
is played on a graph G, in discrete time steps (turns) and involves two players: the Cop (or
Pursuer) and the Robber (or Evader). At every turn each player is located on a vertex v of G,
and a single player can move to a new location (a vertex v′ adjacent to v). The Cop wins if he
“captures” the Robber, i.e., if at some turn they are both located in the same vertex.
The generalized CR game (GCR game) can be informally described as follows. It involves
two players, the Pursuer and the Evader; the game is played in turns; in each turn a single
player can (subject to certain restrictions) move between elements of a finite set, resulting in a
new “configuration” of player locations; there is a set of target (“capture”) configurations; the
Pursuer wins if a target configuration is reached and the Evader wins otherwise.
It is easy to see that the classic CR is a special case of GCR game. As explained in [4] (where
details and references are provided) the definition of GCR games also encompasses the following
games: Distance-k Cops and Robbers, Tandem-win Cops and Robbers, Cops and Robbers with
traps, Eternal domination, Revolutionaries and Spies, Seepage and many more.
2.2 Formal Description of the GCR Game
We now give, in several steps, our formal description of the GCR game; it is quite similar but
not identical to the one given in [4].
2.2.1 General Rules
A GCR game involves two players, P 1 (Pursuer) and P 2 (Evader); for n ∈ {1, 2}, P n’s possible
locations are the elements of a finite set V n.
A nonterminal game state (or position) is a triple (x1, x2, p) where (for n ∈ {1, 2}) xn ∈ V n
indicates P n’s location and p indicates the single player who currently “has the move” (i.e. can
change his location). The set of all nonterminal game states is
S = V 1 × V 2 × {1, 2} .
We will also use a terminal state τ , so that the full state set is
S = S ∪ {τ} .
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The game starts at a prespecified initial state s0 ∈ S and is played in turns ; in each turn a
single player moves (i.e., changes location). Movement rules will be described in Section 2.2.2.
A target set Sc ⊆ S is given; Sc contains the capture states. The set of noncapture states is
Snc = S\Sc. So we have the partition
S = Snc ∪ Sc.
We will also need the sets
∀n ∈ {1, 2} : Sn =
{
s =
(
x1, x2, n
)}
;
i.e., Sn is the set of states in which P n has the move. This results in another partition of S:
S = S1 ∪ S2.
It is assumed that both players have perfect information, i.e., at every turn of the game both
players have complete access to and knowledge of the way the game has been played so far.
Example 2.1 In the CR game P 1 is the Cop and P 2 is the Robber. The location sets are
V 1 = V 2 = V , the vertex set of a graph G = (V,E). The nonterminal state set is
S =
{(
x1, x2, n
)
: x1, x2 ∈ V, n ∈ {1, 2}
}
.
The capture set Sc is
S =
{(
x1, x1, n
)
: x1 ∈ V, n ∈ {1, 2}
}
.
This is almost exactly the classic CR game, with one difference: we omit the classic “placement
phase” in which first the Cop and then the Robber choose initial positions. We assume instead
that both initial positions (as well as the first player to move) are given by the prespecified
initial state s0 = (x
1
0, x
2
0, n0).
2.2.2 Movement Rules
At each turn, a player can change his location subject to some movement rules, which are specific
to each particular GCR game. For example, in the classic CR game each player can move from
his current vertex to any adjacent vertex.
To specify movement rules, we will often use the following standard game theoretic notation:
for each n ∈ {1, 2} we use −n to indicate the index of the “other player” (obviously, −n is not
meant as the negative of n). For example, suppose player P n has location xn, then the “other”
player is P−n and has location x−n.
We have already mentioned that each game state specifies which player makes the next
move. Unlike both classic CR and the GCR of [4], we do not demand that the players alternate
in taking moves ; in making a move, a player may take the game to a state in which he again
has the move.
For every state s = (xn, x−n, n) there exists a nonempty set M (s) of possible next moves for
P n (the player who has the move). To conform to the stochastic game formulation, we assume
that a GCR game is played for an infinite number of turns. That is, even after a capture state
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is reached, the game will continue ad infinitum, but in a trivial manner. Namely, in every GCR
game the only successor of a capture state is the terminal state:
s ∈ Sc ⇒M (s) = {τ}
which can only transit into itself
M (τ) = {τ} .
In short, the movement rules of a particular GCR game can be encoded by
M = (M (s))s∈S ,
the collection of possible next moves available for each state. Note that M also specifies (im-
plicitly) the state set S which in turn specifies the location sets V 1, V 2. GivenM, we can define
for each state s = (xn, x−n, n) a nonempty set N (s) (the set of successor states of s):
N
(
xn, x−n, n
)
=
{(
y, x−n,−n
)
: y ∈M
(
xn, x−n, n
)}
.
Then
N = (N (s))s∈S ,
is the collection of the successor state sets and it implicitly specifies the state set S and the
location sets V 1, V 2. BothM and N encode the same information; we will use the N encoding,
because it simplifies the game analysis.
Example 2.2 Continuing from Example 2.1, in the CR game played on the graph G = (V,E),
letting λ denote the “null move” and τ denote the terminal state, we have
∀s =
(
xn, x−n, n
)
∈ S : M (s) = {z : {xp, z} ∈ E} and M (τ) = {λ} ;
∀s =
(
xn, x−n, n
)
∈ S : N (s) =
{(
z, x−p, p
)
: {xp, z} ∈ E
}
and N (τ) = {τ} .
2.2.3 Payoff Functions, Winning Conditions
It remains to define winning conditions for the GCR game. In accordance with the classic
CR game, a reasonable definition is that the Pursuer wins iff a capture state is reached. To
conform with the game theoretic formulation, this definition should be given, in terms of a
payoff function. Actually, we will use a somewhat different definition which involves two payoff
functions, as seen below.
Definition 2.3 The turn payoff function q (s) specifies the amount gained by the Evader (and
lost by the Pursuer) at every turn of GCR in which the current state is s; it is defined by
q (s) =
{
1 iff s ∈ Snc
0 iff s ∈ Sc ∪ {τ}
. (1)
Definition 2.4 The total payoff function Q (s0s1...) specifies the amount gained by the Evader
(and lost by the Pursuer) in a play of GCR with state sequence s0s1...; it is defined by
Q (s0s1s2...) =
∞∑
t=0
q (st) . (2)
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The following remarks can be made regarding the significance of the payoff functions.
1. When the game goes through the state sequence s0s1... , clearly Q (s0s1s2...) is the capture
time, i.e., the number of turns until capture is effected; if Q (s0s1s2...) =∞ then capture
is never effected.
2. It is also clear that, by the above payoff functions, GCR is a zero-sum game. The Pursuer
wants to minimize (and the Evader wants to maximize) capture time.
3. Hence we have refined the original winning condition: the Pursuer not only wants to
capture the Evader in finite time (and hence win); he wants to capture in the shortest
possible time.
2.2.4 The Stochastic Game GCR
Keeping in mind all of the above, we have the following two definitions.
Definition 2.5 A GCR game is a tuple (N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) where
1. N describes the movement rules (and implicitly the state set S and the location sets
V 1, V 2);
2. S1 and S2 describe which player has the move in every state;
3. Sc describes the capture (winning) condition;
4. s0 is the initial state.
Definition 2.6 A GCR game family is a tuple (N,S1, S2, Sc).
By the above definitions, given the game family (N,S1, S2, Sc) and a specific initial state
s0 ∈ S, we obtain a particular game (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s0). In other words, every element of the
family (N,S1, S2, Sc) is a game played by the same rules but from a different initial state. In
Section 3 we will mostly prove properties of the entire family (N,S1, S2, Sc) which will also imply
corresponding properties of all specific games (N, S1, S2, Sc, s0).
Now recall the definition of a stochastic game [9]. It is a sequence of one-turn games; at
every turn a particular one-turn game is played, the players receive their turn payoff and the
next game to be played is selected, depending on the current game and players’ actions; the
total payoff to each player is the sum of his turn payoffs1. Obviously, a GCR game family is
a stochastic game and we could, at this point, obtain the full GCR solution by invoking well
known stochastic games results [9]. However we will avoid this route since, as mentioned, we
want to present a self-contained solution.
At first sight, our definition of GCR games and the one given by Bonato and MacGillivray
[4] differ in several respects; these differences will be discussed in Section 4, where we will show
that our results also apply to the Bonato-MacGillivray games. Here we only mention what
1Despite the term “stochastic”, the above definition contains as a special case a game which evolves in a fully
deterministic manner (when all player actions and transitions to the next game are deterministic).
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we consider to be the most important difference. Namely, the GCR game of [4] starts with
a “placement phase”, in which first P 1 and then P 2 chooses his initial location. This yields
an initial state s0 and the remaining part of the Bonato-MacGillivray game is basically our
(N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) game.
2.3 Additional Game Theoretic Concepts
We conclude this section by presenting some additional standard game theoretic concepts which
will prove useful in the sequel. In what follows we assume that a game family (N,S1, S2, Sc) has
been specified, so it is usually omitted from the notation.
Definition 2.7 A history h = s0s1... is a finite or infinite sequence of states.
Definition 2.8 We define the following sets of histories
the set of finite length histories : H∗ = {h : h = s0s1s2...sT , T ∈ N0, ∀t : st ∈ S} ,
the set of infinite length histories : H∞ = {h : h = s0s1s2..., ∀t : st ∈ S} .
Definition 2.9 A (pure or deterministic) strategy σ : H∗ → S is a function which maps finite
histories to next states.
Regarding the above definition, the following points must be emphasized.
1. We could also have defined randomized2 strategies but these will not be needed in our
analysis, because the GCR game has perfect information.
2. We deviate from the “standard” pure strategy definition. In the context of stochastic
games, the usual definition specifies a strategy as a function which maps finite histories to
next moves. However, since the GCR game evolves deterministically, a move specifies the
next state. Hence our definition is sufficient (and more convenient) for our purposes.
Definition 2.10 A strategy σm is called positional if it depends only on the current state st,
but neither on previous states nor on current time t, i.e.,
∀h = s0s1...st, h
′ = s′0s
′
1..., s
′
t′ : st = s
′
t′ = s⇒ σ
m (h) = σm (h′) = σm (s) .
A strategy is called nonpositional iff it is not positional.
Notation 2.11 H (σ1, σ2|N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) denotes the infinite history s0s1s2... generated when:
(i) the game is (N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) and (ii) for n ∈ {1, 2}, P
n uses σn. When (N,S1, S2, Sc) is
understood from the context, we simply write H (σ1, σ2|s0) .
Notation 2.12 T (σ1, σ2|N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) denotes the capture time, i.e., the first (actually the
only) time at which a capture state s ∈ Sc is reached when: (i) the game is (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s0)
and (ii) for n ∈ {1, 2}, P n uses σn. When (N,S1, S2, Sc) is understood from the context, we
simply write T (σ1, σ2|s0).
2More precisely, behavioral strategies [9].
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Remark 2.13 It is obvious that
T
(
σ1, σ2|N, S1, S2, Sc, s0
)
= Q
(
H
(
σ1, σ2|N, S1, S2, Sc, s0
))
.
We conclude by presenting several well-known definitions and facts about zero-sum games in a
notation specific to a GCR game3. What follows concerns a specific game (N,S1, S2, Sc), which
we assume known and (for brevity) do not include in the notation.
Definition 2.14 For every s we define the following two quantities
lower value of
(
N,S1, S2, Sc
)
: T− (s) = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
,
upper value of
(
N,S1, S2, Sc
)
: T+ (s) = inf
σ1
sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
.
Proposition 2.15 For every s we have
T− (s) = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
≤ inf
σ1
sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
= T+ (s) .
Definition 2.16 We say that game (N,S1, S2, Sc) has a value T̂ (s) iff
T− (s) = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
= T+ (s) .
in which case we define
T̂ (s) = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
.
Proposition 2.17 Game (N,S1, S2, Sc) has value T̂ (s) and optimal strategies σ̂
1, σ̂2 iff
∀σ2 : T (σ̂1, σ2|s) ≤ T̂ (s) ,
∀σ1 : T (σ1, σ̂2|s) ≥ T̂ (s) .
3 Solution of the GCR Game
In Section 2.2 we have formulated GCR as a two-player, zero-sum stochastic game (N,S1, S2, Sc).
By “solving (N,S1, S2, Sc)” we mean proving that, for every s ∈ S, the game (N,S
1, S2, Sc, s)
has value and optimal strategies, as well as computing these quantities. All of these things can
be achieved by using standard results regarding stochastic games [9]. However, as mentioned,
we want to provide a self-contained solution. Actually, we will provide two such solutions, one
in Section 3.1 and another in Section 3.2.
3The general form of these facts appears in Appendix A.
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3.1 Vertex Labeling Solution
Our first solution of (N, S1, S2, Sc) is obtained by studying the properties of a vertex labeling
algorithm (VL algorithm) which is our own version of an algorithm first presented in [7] (for
the CR game) and then in [4] (for the GCR game). Our analysis is more detailed than the
ones presented in [7, 4], mainly because we spell out all the game theoretic aspects missing from
[7, 4]. The differences between our approach and that of [7, 4] will be discussed in Section 4.
Algorithm 1 : The Vertex Labeling Algorithm
Require: The game family (N, S1, S2, Sc).
1: for s ∈ S do
2: if s ∈ Sc then
3: T 0 (s) = 0
4: else
5: T 0 (s) =∞
6: end if
7: end for
8: for i = 1, 2, .. do
9: for s ∈ S do
10: if T i−1 (s) <∞ then
11: T i (s) = T i−1 (s)
12: else if s ∈ S1 then
13: T i (s) = 1 + mins′∈N(s) T
i−1 (s′)
14: else if s ∈ S2 then
15: T i (s) = 1 + maxs′∈N(s) T
i−1 (s′)
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
The VL algorithm produces, for every s ∈ S, an infinite sequence
T 0(s), T 1(s), T 2(s), ....
The only two forms which (T i(s))i∈N0 can take are:
1. for every i ∈ N0, T
i(s) has the same value (which is either 0 or ∞),
2. there exists some n ∈ N such that T i(s) =∞ for i ∈ {0, ..., n− 1} and T i(s) = m ∈ N for
i ∈ {n, n+ 1, ...}.
Hence the following are well defined (with the understanding that min ∅ =∞).
Definition 3.1 For all s ∈ S we define
T (s) = lim
i→∞
T i(s), (3)
T˜ (s) = min{i : T i(s) <∞}. (4)
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Our next goal is to show that, for all s ∈ S, T (s) = T˜ (s). In other words, if T i (s) attains a
finite value at the i-th iteration of the VL algorithm, this value (which equals the limit T (s))
will be i. We need the following auxiliary proposition.
Proposition 3.2 For all s ∈ S, we have(
T˜ (s) = n <∞
)
⇒
(
∀i ≥ n : T i (s) = T (s) ≤ n
)
. (5)
Proof. Let us first prove that, for all s ∈ S and n ∈ N0, we have(
T˜ (s) = n <∞
)
⇒ T n (s) ≤ n. (6)
Clearly (6) holds for n = 0; assume it holds for n ∈ {0, 1, ..., k}. Now, if for some s we have
T˜ (s) = k+1 then T k (s) =∞ and T k+1 (s) <∞. From this and lines 10-16 of the VL algorithm,
we see that
T k+1 (s) = 1 + T k (s′)
for some s′ ∈ N (s) which satisfies T k (s′) = m < ∞. But then T˜ (s′) ≤ k which, by the
inductive assumption, implies T k (s′) ≤ k. Hence T k+1 (s) ≤ k + 1 and we have proved (6) for
every n ∈ N0. Now (5) follows from lines 10-11 of the VL algorithm.
Proposition 3.3 For every s ∈ S we have:
T (s) = T˜ (s) . (7)
Proof. We partition S into the following two sets
Sa =
{
s : T˜ (s) =∞
}
, Sb =
{
s : T˜ (s) <∞
}
.
If s ∈ Sa, then T˜ (s) =∞; then
{i : T i (s) <∞} = ∅ ⇒
(
∀i : T i (s) =∞
)
;
hence T (s) =∞. We conclude that
∀s ∈ Sa : T (s) = T˜ (s) . (8)
To complete the proof of (7), we must prove
∀s ∈ Sb : T (s) = T˜ (s) . (9)
To this end we will show that, for all n ∈ N0, we have
∀s ∈ Sb : T˜ (s) = n⇒ T (s) = T
n (s) = T n+1 (s) = ... = n. (10)
Now, (10) clearly holds for n = 0. Suppose it holds for n ∈ {0, 1, ..., k}. Take any state s ∈ Sb
such that T˜ (s) = k + 1. Then we have
T k (s) =∞, (11)
T k+1 (s) = T k+2 (s) = ... = T (s) = m ≤ k + 1 <∞. (12)
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1. If s ∈ S1, (11)-(12) imply that there exists some s′ ∈ N (s) such that
T k (s′) = min
u∈N(s)
T k (u) and T k+1 (s) = 1 + T k (s′) .
Also (11) implies that minu∈N(s) T
k−1 (u) =∞ and hence
T k−1 (s′) =∞. (13)
But T k (s′) = T k+1 (s)− 1 <∞; hence T˜ (s′) = k and, using the inductive assumption, we
have
T (s′) = T k (s) = T k+1 (s) = ... = k ⇒
T (s) = T k+1 (s) = T k+2 (s) = ... = 1 + T k (s′) = 1 + k.
2. If s ∈ S2, (12) implies that maxu∈N(s) T
k (u) < ∞; hence for all u ∈ N (s) we have
T k (u) < ∞. On the other hand, (11) implies that there exists some s′ ∈ N (s) such that
T k−1 (s′) =∞. Hence T˜ (s′) = k. We also have
T k+1 (s) = m <∞⇒
(
∀u ∈ N (s) : T k (u) <∞
)
⇒
(
∀u ∈ N (s) : T˜ (u) ≤ k
)
⇒
(
∀u ∈ N (s) : T (u) = T k (u) ≤ k
)
(the last line following from Proposition 3.3). Hence s′ achieves the maximum:
T k (s′) = max
u∈N(s)
T k (u) = k
and so
T (s) = T k+1 (s) = T k+2 (s) = ... = 1 + T k (s′) = 1 + k.
Thus we have proved that (10) holds for every n ∈ N0, and we are done.
We also have the following useful and easily provable proposition.
Proposition 3.4 The collection
(
T (s)
)
s∈S
satisfies the following:
∀s ∈ S1\Sc : T (s) = 1 + min
s′∈N(s)
T (s′) , (14)
∀s ∈ S2\Sc : T (s) = 1 + max
s′∈N(s)
T (s′) , (15)
Proof. Simply take the limits in lines 13 and 15 of the VL algorithm.
The system of equations (14)-(15) is the perfect information version of the optimality equations
which play a central role in stochastic games [9].
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We will next show that, for every s ∈ S, T (s) is the value of the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s).
Furthermore, we will use the collection
(
T (s)
)
s∈S
to define optimal strategies for P 1 and P 2.
To avoid ambiguities in the definition of the optimal strategies we modify the functions
argmin and argmax as follows. Given the collection of successor states N = (N (s))s∈S, we
assume that S is equipped with a fixed total order. Then, for every s ∈ S, expressions such
as “the first element of N(s) such that ...” are well defined. Now, for every function f : S →
R ∪ {∞}, we (re)define argmin and argmax:
∀s ∈ S : arg min
s′∈N(s)
f (s′) = “the first element u ∈ N(s) s.t. f (u) = min
s′∈N(s)
f (s′) ”,
∀s ∈ S : arg max
s′∈N(s)
f (s′) = “the first element u ∈ N(s) s.t. f (u) = max
s′∈N(s)
f (s′) ”.
Definition 3.5 Given the game family (N, Sc), with labels
(
T (s)
)
s∈Sc
, we define the following
two strategies
A Pursuer strategy σ̂1 : ∀s ∈ S1\Sc : σ̂
1 (s) = argmin s′∈N(s)T (s
′) ,
A Evader strategy σ̂2 : ∀s ∈ S2\Sc : σ̂
2 (s) = argmax s′∈N(s)T (s
′) .
Proposition 3.6 Given the game family (N, S1, S2, Sc), for every s ∈ S: T (s) is the value of
the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s), and σ̂
1, σ̂2 are optimal positional strategies.
Proof. Assuming (N, S1, S2, Sc) given and fixed, we drop it from all subsequent notation.
It follows immediately from Definition 3.5 that σ̂1, σ̂2 are positional strategies. Given Propo-
sition 2.17, to prove the rest of the theorem it suffices to show that
∀s ∈ S : ∀σ2 : T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ T (s), (16)
∀s ∈ S : ∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ̂2|s
)
≥ T (s). (17)
The rest of the proof is divided into two parts.
Part I. Take any s such that T (s) <∞.
1. First we show that σ̂1 satisfies (16), by showing that, for every n ∈ N0 we have:
∀s : T (s) = n⇒
(
∀σ2 : T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ T (s)
)
. (18)
Obviously (18) holds when T (s) = 0 (because then s ∈ Sc and T (σ
1, σ2|s) = 0 for all
σ1, σ2). Assume it holds for all n ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} and pick any s such that T (s) = k + 1.
(a) Suppose s ∈ S1. From (14) we have
k + 1 = 1 + min
s′∈N(s)
T (s′)⇒ min
s′∈N(s)
T (s′) = k.
Hence, for s = σ̂1 (s) = argmins′∈N(s) T (s
′) we have T (s) = k. By the inductive
assumption, we then have
∀σ2 : T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ T (s) = k.
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In other words, if P 1 uses σ̂1 in the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) then he will achieve capture
in at most k moves, no matter how P 2 plays. Since s ∈ N(s), P 1 can also use σ̂1 in
the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s). This means he will move from s to s and then will play
exactly as in game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s). This ensures capture in at most k + 1 moves,
no matter how P 2 plays, i.e.,
∀σ2 : T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ k + 1.
Therefore σ̂1 satisfies (16) for all s ∈ S1 with T (s) = k + 1.
(b) Suppose s ∈ S2. From relation (15) we have
k + 1 = 1 + max
s′∈N(s)
T (s′)⇒ max
s′∈N(s))
T (s′) = k.
Thus, whatever the initial move by player P 2 in game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s), the resulting
state s will satisfy T (s) ≤ k. Again, by the inductive assumption, we have
∀σ2 : T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ T (s) ≤ k
and hence, in the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s), P
1 can use σ̂1 and capture in at most k
moves (no matter what P 2 plays). We then get, by the same reasoning as above, that
∀σ2 : T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ k + 1.
Therefore σ̂1 satisfies (16) for all s ∈ S2 with T (s) = k + 1.
Hence we have shown that σ̂1 satisfies (16),
2. Next we show inductively that σ̂2 satisfies (17). I.e., we show that: for every n ∈ N0 we
have:
∀s : T (s) = n⇒
(
∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ̂2|s
)
≥ T (s)
)
. (19)
Obviously (19) holds when T (s) = 0. Assume it holds for all n ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} and pick any
s such that T (s) = k + 1.
(a) Suppose s ∈ S2. Similarly to the previous case, from (15) we get maxs′∈N(s) T (s
′) = k.
Hence for s = σ̂2 (s) = argmaxs′∈N(s) T (s
′) we have T (s) = k. By the inductive
assumption we then have
∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ̂2|s
)
≥ T (s) = k.
Hence P 2 using σ̂2 in the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) can ensure capture will take k
turns or more, no matter how P 1 plays. Reasoning as previously, P 2 using σ̂2 in
(N, S1, S2, Sc, s) can ensure capture will take k+1 turns or more, no matter how P
1
plays, i.e.,
∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ̂2|s
)
≥ k + 1.
Therefore σ̂2 satisfies (17) for all s ∈ S2 with T (s) = k + 1.
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(b) Finally, suppose s ∈ S1; by an argument similar to that of case 1.b above we get that
∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ̂2|s
)
≥ k + 1.
Therefore σ̂2 satisfies (17) for all s ∈ S1 with T (s) = k + 1.
Hence we have shown that σ̂2 satisfies (17).
We have completed the proof of (16)-(17) for all s such that T (s) <∞.
Part II. Now take any state s such that T (s) =∞. Then we clearly have
∀s ∈ S : ∀σ2 : T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ T (s) =∞;
which proves (16). To prove (17), first set s0 = s and then, for any Pursuer strategy σ
1, let
s0s1s2... = H
(
σ1, σ̂2|s0
)
.
We want to show that s0s1s2... never reaches a capture state. We will actually prove something
(apparently) stronger:
∀t ∈ N0 : T (st) =∞. (20)
Suppose (20) is false and let sk+1 be the first element of s0s1s2... with T (st) <∞. I.e.,
∀t ≤ k : T (st) =∞ and T (sk+1) = m <∞. (21)
If sk ∈ S
2, then sk+1 = σ̂
2 (sk) = argmaxs′∈sk T (s
′) and
∞ = T (sk) = 1 + T (sk+1)⇒ T (sk+1) =∞. (22)
If sk ∈ S
1, then clearly (for any σ1) sk+1 ∈ N (sk). Since T (sk+1) = m <∞ we will have
T (sk) = 1 + min
s′∈N(sk)
T (s′) ≤ 1 + T (sk+1) = 1 +m <∞. (23)
In both (22) and (23) we have a contradiction. We conclude that we cannot have T (st) < ∞
for any t; consequently (20) is true. Hence we have completed the proof of (16)-(17) for all s
such that T (s) =∞.
Remark 3.7 It is worth noting that the VL algorithm is both implements both Backward
Induction and Value Iteration.
3.2 An Alternative Solution
We will now present an alternative approach to the solution of the GCR game. While this
approach reaches the same conclusions as the VL-based approach of Section 3.1, it underscores
certain aspects of the GCR game which are not obvious in the VL-based approach. On the other
hand, the new approach is not totally self-contained; in particular it invokes Von Neumann’s
famous MinMax Theorem [22].
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There is another sense in which the approach of this section appears weaker than the VL-
based one. Namely we assume here that the two players move alternately, i.e., that every move
by P n is followed a move by P−n. However this assumption is introduced only for clarity of
presentation; the proofs can be modified so that they hold when the alternate-moves assumption
is removed.
We start by introducing the concepts of Pursuer-win and Evader-win games, which are
generalizations of the well known concepts of cop-win and robber-win graphs.
Definition 3.8 The game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is called Pursuer-win (P-win) iff P
1 has a strategy
σ1 which effects capture for every Evader strategy σ2; (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is called Evader-win
(E-win) iff P 2 has a strategy σ2 which avoids capture for every Pursuer strategy σ1. In other
words (
N, S1, S2, Sc, s
)
is P-win iff : ∃σ1 : ∀σ2 : T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
<∞, (24)(
N, S1, S2, Sc, s
)
is E-win iff : ∃σ2 : ∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞ (25)
A point that is not often stressed in the discussion of cop-win and robber-win graphs is that we
cannot automatically conclude that a graph is either cop-win or robber-win. More generally, we
cannot automatically conclude that the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is either P-win or E-win, because
the opposite of (24) is
∀σ1 : ∃σ2σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ2σ1 |s
)
=∞ (26)
(i.e., the Evader strategy σ2
σ1
which ensures no capture takes place will in general depend on the
Pursuer strategy σ1); and (26) is not equivalent to (25). However, we can prove that, indeed,
any (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is either E-win or P-win.
Proposition 3.9 Every (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is either P-win or E-win.
Proof. Pick any (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) which is not P-win. We will show that it is E-win by con-
structing an Evader strategy σ2 which satisfies (25).
Suppose that s belongs to S1 and let s0 = s. Further, suppose that P
1 uses some strategy
by which the game moves from s0 to some s1. From (26) we know that for any such s1, P
2
has at least one strategy by which he can ensure capture never takes place. Suppose by some
such strategy the game moves to some s2 (which will in general depend on s0 and s1). For all
possible s1’s define
σ2 (s0s1) = s2.
This defines the part of σ2 which applies to all histories belonging to
{h = s0s1 : s1 ∈ N (s0)} .
Now, from s2 = σ
2 (s0s1) the game can (depending on P
1’s strategy) move to any s3 ∈ N (s1);
since (N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) is not P-win, P
2 has at least one strategy by which he can ensure capture
never takes place from s3. Suppose by some such strategy the game moves to some s4 (which
will in general depend on s0s1s2s3). For all possible s3’s define
σ2 (s0s1s2s3) = s4.
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This defines the part of σ2 which applies to all histories belonging to
{h = s0s1s2s3 : st ∈ N (st−1) for t ∈ {1, 2, 3}} .
Continuing in this manner we can extend the definition of σ2 to all legal histories starting at
s0 and having finite length. The extension is such that: for every finite history s0s1...s2n+1,
σ (s0s1...s2n+1) leads to a state from which P
2 can ensure capture never takes place. We can
complete the definition of σ2 (on the rest of its domain H∗) by specifying legal but otherwise
arbitrary moves. Hence we have constructed a σ2 which ensures that capture will never take
place, no matter how P 1 plays. In other words we have
∃σ2 : ∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ
2|s0
)
=∞
which is exactly (25) and shows that (N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) is E-win. So we have shown that: for
every s0 ∈ S
1, if (N, S1, S2, Sc, s0) is not P-win, then it is E-win.
By a similar argument we reach the same conclusion for all s0 ∈ S
2; hence the proof is
complete.
The next proposition shows that: (i) if (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is P-win then there is a Pursuer
strategy which provides an upper bound (valid for all σ2 strategies) on the capture time; (ii)
if (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is E-win then there is an Evader strategy which ensures capture never takes
place. Our proof is an adaptation of Zermelo’s proof of a similar proposition regarding chess
[14, 21]. While our proof is more detailed than Zermelo’s, it is based on his basic ideas.
Proposition 3.10 If (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is P-win, then
∃Ta (s) : ∃σ
1 : sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
≤ Ta (s) <∞. (27)
If (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is E-win, then
∃σ2 : inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞ (28)
Proof. Let us partition the state set S into three subsets
Sp =
{
s : ∃σ1 : (i) ∀σ2 : T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
<∞ and (ii) sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
<∞
}
,
Sq =
{
s : ∃σ1 : (i) ∀σ2 : T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
<∞ and (ii) sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞
}
,
Sr =
{
s : ∃σ2 : ∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞
}
.
Sp ∪ Sq (resp. Sr) is the set of all states such that (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s) is P-win (resp. E-win).
Clearly Sc ⊆ Sp. We will prove by contradiction that Sq = ∅ and hence conclude that (27) is
true. So suppose that there exists s0 ∈ Sq∩S
1. If the Pursuer moves from s0 into some s1 ∈ Sp,
then (
∃σ1 : sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s1
)
<∞
)
⇒
(
∃σ˜1 : sup
σ2
T
(
σ˜1, σ2|s0
)
<∞
)
⇒ s 6∈ Sq
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which contradicts the initial assumption. Hence all the Pursuer’s moves must lead to some
s1 ∈ (Sq ∪ Sr) ∩ S2. Applying the same reasoning to s1, we see that the Evader must have a
move into some s2 ∈ (Sq ∪ Sr) ∩ S1. Continuing in this manner, we see that
∃σ˜2 : ∀σ1 : H
(
σ1, σ˜2|s0
)
= s0s1s2... such that: ∀n : sn ∈ Sq ∪ Sr
which, since Sc ∩ (Sq ∪ Sr) = ∅, means
∃σ˜2 : ∀σ1 : T
(
s0|σ
1, σ˜2
)
=∞
which contradicts s0 ∈ Sq. Hence there cannot exist any s0 ∈ Sq ∩ S
1. By the same argument
we conclude that there cannot exist any s0 ∈ Sq ∩ S
2. Hence Sq is empty and we have proved
(27).
We prove (28) immediately by using (25):(
∀σ1 : T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞
)
⇒ inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞.
The proof of the proposition is complete.
Our next goal is to prove that every (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) has a value and optimal Pursuer and
Evader strategies. Before proceeding in this direction we need some auxiliary material.
Definition 3.11 Given the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) and any K ∈ N0, the K-truncated game (or
simply the truncated game) (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)[K] is identical to (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s) except for the
fact that it is played for K turns; consequently it has payoff function
Q (s0s1...sK) =
K∑
t=0
q (st) .
Proposition 3.12 For every K ∈ N0, the game (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s)[K] has a value and determin-
istic optimal strategies.
Proof. A full proof can be found in [22]. The main point is that the truncated game is a finite
game and hence known to have a value and optimal strategies. The strategies are deterministic
because the game has perfect information.
Definition 3.13 Given the truncated game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)[K] and strategies σ
1, σ2, we define
T[K]
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
= Q
(
H
(
σ1, σ2|s
))
.
In other words, T[K] (σ
1, σ2|s) is P 2’s payoff in (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)[K] when the strategies σ
1, σ2 are
used.
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We use the bound Ta (s) of Proposition 3.10 to define the truncated game (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s)[Ta(s)];
by Definition 3.13, when the players use strategies σ1 and σ2 the corresponding payoff is
T[Ta(s)] (σ
1, σ2|s). To simplify notation we write (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)# in place of (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s)[Ta(s)]
and T# (σ
1, σ2|s) in place of T[Ta(s)] (σ
1, σ2|s). As mentioned, (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)# has a value T̂ (s)
and an optimal deterministic strategy pair (σ̂1, σ̂2).
In what follows we will often need to use the “same” strategies in both (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)
and (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)#. The domain of a strategy σ
n for (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is the set of all finite
histories, so we can also use σn in (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)# by applying it only to histories of length at
most Ta (s). To use a (N, S
1, S2, Sc, s)# strategy σ
n in (N, S1, S2, Sc, s), we extend it as follows:
for each history h with length greater than Ta (s), σ
n (h) is the stay-in-place move.
We are now ready to prove that (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) has a value T̂ (s) and an optimal deterministic
strategy pair (σ̂1, σ̂2).
Proposition 3.14 For every s ∈ S, the game (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) has a value T̂ (s) and optimal
Pursuer and Evader strategies σ̂1, σ̂2 which attain the value, i.e., T̂ (s) = T (σ̂1, σ̂2|s).
Proof. We treat the P-win and E-win cases separately. Because of perfect information, all
strategies mentioned in the rest of the proof are deterministic.
Part I. Suppose that s ∈ S is such that (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is P-win. Keeping in mind the
stay-in-place extension of strategies we see the following.
1. P 1 can use the σ1 of Proposition 3.10 in (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)# and clearly we have
sup
σ2
T#
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
≤ Ta (s)
(the Evader cannot have a higher payoff than the number of turns).
2. P 1 (resp. P 2) can use σ̂1 (resp. σ̂2) in (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)# and
T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
= T#
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
= sup
σ2
inf
σ1
T#
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
T#
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
≤ Ta (s) . (29)
The equality T (σ̂1, σ̂2|s) = T# (σ̂
1, σ̂2|s) follows from the fact that (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is
P-win; hence, by Proposition 3.10, σ1 guarantees capture in at most Ta (s) turns and σ̂
1
(which is optimal) will do at least as well. Since (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)# lasts for Ta (s) turns,
the required inequality is obvious.
3. From optimality and Proposition 2.17 we also get
∀σ1, σ2 : T#
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
≤ T#
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
≤ T#
(
σ1, σ̂2|s
)
. (30)
Now suppose there exists some strategy σ˜1 such that
T
(
σ˜1, σ̂2|s
)
< T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
≤ Ta (s) .
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Then we will also have
T#
(
σ˜1, σ̂2|s
)
= T
(
σ˜1, σ̂2|s
)
< T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
= T#
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
which contradicts (30).
Similarly, suppose there exists some strategy σ˜2 such that
T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
< T
(
σ̂1, σ˜2|s
)
. (31)
Then we have the following cases.
1. If T (σ̂1, σ˜2|s) ≤ Ta (s) then (both (σ̂
1, σ˜2) and (σ̂1, σ̂2) result in capture before the trun-
cated game is over):
T#
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
= T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
< T
(
σ̂1, σ˜2|s
)
= T#
(
σ̂1, σ˜2|s
)
;
which contradicts (30).
2. If T (σ̂1, σ˜2|s) > Ta (s) then T# (σ̂
1, σ˜2|s) = Ta (s) (the truncated game finishes before
capture) and we have the following subcases.
Ta (s) > T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
⇒ T#
(
σ̂1, σ˜2|s
)
= Ta (s) > T#
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
which contradicts (30); and
Ta (s) = T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
⇒ T#
(
σ̂1, σ˜2|s
)
= Ta (s) = T#
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
which contradicts (31).
Part II. Suppose that s ∈ S is such that (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) is E-win. In this case we start from
(28) and get
inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞⇒ sup
σ2
inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞⇒ sup
σ2
inf
σ1
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
T
(
σ1, σ2|s
)
=∞.
Hence we have shown T̂ (s) = ∞. Since σ2 achieves T̂ (s), it is an Evader optimal strategy.
Any σ1 achieves T̂ (s), hence any σ1 is a Pursuer optimal strategy.
Definition 3.15 We define the following two positional strategies
A Pursuer strategy σ̂1 : ∀s ∈ S1\Sc : σ̂
1 (s) = argmin s′∈N(s)T̂ (s
′) ,
An Evader strategy σ̂2 : ∀s ∈ S2\Sc : σ̂
2 (s) = argmax s′∈N(s)T̂ (s
′) .
The next proposition shows (σ̂1, σ̂2) is an optimal strategy pair in (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) for every s.
For the sake of brevity, in the proof we will use the following notation: given a strategy profile
σ = (σ1, σ2) and a state s = (x1, x2, p), we let
σ (s) =
(
σp (s) , x−p,−p
)
.
In other words, σ (s) is the state to which s transits when the player P p (who has the move in
s) applies his strategy σp.
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Proposition 3.16 For a given (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) and for all s, we have
∀σ1 : ∀s : T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
≤ T
(
σ1, σ̂2|s
)
, (32)
∀σ2 : ∀s : T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s
)
≥ T
(
σ̂1, σ2|s
)
. (33)
Proof. We will only prove (32) for any s ∈ S1 (the proofs of the remaining parts are similar).
Let s0 = s and σ̂ = (σ̂
1, σ̂2); furthermore, pick any Pursuer strategy σ1 and let σ˜ = (σ1, σ̂2).
Now define the state sequences s0s˜1s˜2... and s0ŝ1ŝ2... as follows
s˜1 = σ˜ (s0) , s˜2 = σ˜ (s˜1) , s˜3 = σ˜ (s˜2) , s˜4 = σ˜ (s˜3) , ...
ŝ1 = σ̂ (s0) , ŝ2 = σ̂ (s˜1) , ŝ3 = σ̂ (s˜2) , ŝ4 = σ̂ (s˜3) , ...
Note that s˜0s˜1s˜2... is H (σ˜|s0) but ŝ0ŝ1ŝ2... is not H (σ̂|s0) (why?). Also note that
s˜2 = ŝ2, s˜4 = ŝ4, s˜6 = ŝ6, s˜8 = ŝ8, ... .
Because σ̂1 always chooses minimizing successor states, we have the following sequence of
inequalities.
T (σ̂|s0) = 1 + T (σ̂|ŝ1) ≤ 1 + T (σ̂|s˜1)
T (σ̂|s˜1) = 1 + T (σ̂|ŝ2) = 1 + T (σ̂|s˜2)⇒ T (σ̂|s0) ≤ 2 + T (σ̂|s˜2)
T (σ̂|s˜2) = 1 + T (σ̂|ŝ3) ≤ 1 + T (σ̂|s˜3)⇒ T (σ̂|s0) ≤ 3 + T (σ̂|s˜3)
T (σ̂|s˜3) = 1 + T (σ̂|ŝ4) = 1 + T (σ̂|s˜4)⇒ T (σ̂|s0) ≤ 4 + T (σ̂|s˜4)
...
This sequence of inequalities (i) either will continue until we reach some s˜K ∈ Sc (ii) or, if no
capture state is ever reached, will go on ad infinitum. Let us consider each case separately.
1. If there exists some K ∈ N such that s˜K ∈ Sc , then T (σ˜|s0) = K and we have
T (σ̂|s0) ≤ K + T (σ̂|sK) = T (σ˜|s0) + 0.
2. If for all k ∈ N we have sk 6∈ Sc , then T (σ˜|s0) =∞ and we have
T (σ̂|s0) ≤ ∞ = T (σ˜|s0) .
In either case we have proved that T (σ̂|s0) ≤ T (σ˜|s0) which, written in more detail, is
∀σ1 : ∀s0 ∈ S
1 : T
(
σ̂1, σ̂2|s0
)
≤ T
(
σ1, σ̂2s0
)
.
In other words we have proved (32); (33) is proved similarly.
To summarize, up to this point we have proved that (N, S1, S2, Sc, s) has a value and optimal
positional strategies σ̂1, σ̂2 (specified in terms of the collection of values
(
T̂ (s)
)
s∈S
) without using
the VL algorithm of Section 3.1. Our final target is to show, without using the results of Section
3.1, that the values (i) satisfy the optimality equations and (ii) can be computed by the VL
algorithm.
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Proposition 3.17 The values
(
T̂ (s)
)
s∈S
of the games (N, S1, S2, Sc, s)s∈S satisfy the optimal-
ity equations.
∀s ∈ Sc : T̂ (s) = 0, (34)
∀s ∈ S1\Sc : T̂ (s) = 1 + min
s′∈N(s)
T̂ (s′) , (35)
∀s ∈ S2\Sc : T̂ (s) = 1 + max
s′∈N(s)
T̂ (s′) . (36)
Proof. Straightforward.
Proposition 3.18 For every n ∈ N0we have
∀s ∈ S : T̂ (s) = n⇒
{
∀m < n : Tm (s) =∞
∀m ≥ n : T n (s) = T̂ (s)
(37)
where
(
(T n (s))s∈S
)
n∈N0
are the quantities computed by the VL algorithm.
Proof. Clearly (37) holds for n = 0. Suppose it holds for all n ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} and consider two
cases.
1. Take any s ∈ S1 such that T̂ (s) = k + 1. Then
T̂ (s) = 1 + min
s′∈N(s)
T̂ (s′) .
Hence
∃s1 ∈ N (s) : T̂ (s1) = k and 6 ∃s2 ∈ N (s) : T̂ (s2) < k.
Then from the inductive hypothesis it follows that
∃s1 ∈ N (s) : T
k (s1) = k, (38)
6 ∃s2 ∈ N (s) : T
k (s2) < k. (39)
From (38)-(39) we have
k = min
s′∈N(s)
T k (s′)⇒ T k+1 (s) = k + 1. (40)
From (39) we also have(
∀s′ ∈ N (s) : T 0 (s′) = ... = T k−1 (s′) =∞
)
⇒ T k (s) = 1 +∞ =∞. (41)
From (40)-(41) and lines 10-16 of the VL algorithm we see that (37) holds for all s ∈ S1
such that T̂ (s) = k + 1.
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2. Take any s ∈ S2 such that T̂ (s) = k + 1. Then
T̂ (s) = 1 + max
s′∈Nout[s]
T̂ (s′) .
Hence
∃s1 ∈ N (s) : T̂ (s1) = k and ∀s
′ ∈ N (s) : T̂ (s′) ≤ k.
Then from the inductive hypothesis it follows that
∃s1 ∈ N (s) : T
k (s1) = k, (42)
∀s′ ∈ N (s) : T k (s′) ≤ k. (43)
From (42)-(43) we have
k = max
s′∈N(s)
T k (s′)⇒ T k+1 (s) = k + 1. (44)
From (42) we also have
T k−1 (s1) =∞⇒ T
k (s) = 1 +∞ =∞. (45)
From (44)-(45) and lines 10-16 of the VL algorithm we see that (37) holds for all s ∈ S2
such that T̂ (s) = k + 1.
Hence (37) holds for all s ∈ S such that T̂ (s) = k + 1 and the proof is completed.
4 Comparison to Other Approaches
Our analysis of Section 3.1 is heavily inspired by [7, 4]. We will now discuss these two papers
and also the less well known [1] in comparison to our own. Let us emphasize that, while we will
criticize some aspects of [7, 4, 1], we find these papers extremely useful; they have provided the
inspiration and foundation for our own more detailed approach.
4.1 Hahn and MacGillivray
In [7] Hahn and MacGillivray study a CR version with two generalizations of the classic game:
(i) the game is played on a directed graph and (ii) more than one cops and/or robbers (“k-cop,
l-robber”) may be involved4. On the other hand, following the classic CR formulation, they
count time (especially capture time) in rounds ; one round includes one move by each cop and
robber token. While we consider the single Cop and single Robber case, our own formulation
can easily accommodate all of the above.
Next we describe two more substantial differences between Hahn and MacGillivray’s ap-
proach and our own. These are really differences between the games being studied in each case.
Namely, in [7]:
4Let us stress that they still deal with a two-player game: there is a single Cop player and a single Robbber
player, but each can control one or more cop and robber tokens.
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1. it is assumed that the two players move alternately and the game always starts with the
Cop moving first (once again this follows the classic CR game formulation);
2. the game starts with an empty graph, the Cop’s first move is to place his token on some
vertex and the Robber’s first move is to place his own token; these two moves constitute
the “placement round”.
However both of the above differences can be easily accommodated by our approach. Ob-
viously, removing the “alternating moves” assumption makes our analysis more general. To
accommodate the “placement round”, we can use a one-round game which consists of two turns:
first the Cop chooses a vertex x10, then the Robber chooses a vertex x
2
0 and then the Robber
gains (the Cop loses) T̂ (x10, x
2
0, 1) payoff units, where T̂ (x
1
0, x
2
0, 1) has been computed for every
vertex pair (x10, x
2
0) by the VL algorithm. Clearly the new game has a value which is
min
x1
0
max
x2
0
T̂
(
x10, x
2
0, 1
)
.
Hence the solution of our GCR game also provides the solution to Hahn and MacGillivray’s
(classic) CR game.
One of the main components of [7] is a vertex labeling algorithm very similar to our own,
which is used to compute optimal capture times (counted in rounds) and strategies. The main
properties of this algorithm are established in Lemma 4 of [7]. We find the proof of this Lemma
not quite rigorous, because precise definitions of strategy and optimality (and also value) are
not provided.
Both “strategy” and “optimal strategy” are used informally in [7]. “Strategy” is not defined.
“Optimal strategy” for the Cop is defined informally as follows: “a strategy from a configuration
cxy [is] optimal for the cop if no other strategy gives a win in fewer moves”. But this is incorrect
(indeed there exist Cop strategies which give capture time better than optimal, but only for some
robber strategies) because it does not take into account the Robber’s strategy. Similar remarks
can be made regarding the informal definition of optimal Robber strategies.
To precisely define “optimal strategy” one must first define “strategy” (as a function from
histories to moves) and then provide an optimality criterion. In Game Theory optimality is
defined in connection with “game value” (which is neither defined nor used in [7]). In the
context of CR and GCR the appropriate definitions are Definitions 2.16 and 2.17 as given in
our Section 2.3.
Consequently, while the main ideas in the proof of Lemma 4 are correct, their elaboration is
not always rigorous (in our opinion). But in some cases the authors’ arguments can be improved
quite easily. For instance, their statement “the cop’s move will be to an x′ ... from which, by
the induction hypothesis, the cop can win in t−1 rounds” should be augmented by: “no matter
how the robber plays”5. Similar remarks apply to other parts of [7].
4.2 Bonato and MacGillivray
As already stated, our main inspiration is [4], in which Bonato and MacGillivray generalize the
games and results of [7]. In place of “Cop” and “Robber”, they use the terms “Pursuer” and
5Of course this is just a verbal description of the sup and inf conditions of our Definition 2.16.
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“Evader”. “Alternating moves” and “placement round” are used in the same manner as in [7].
On the other hand capture is understood in a more general sense; slightly paraphrasing [4], the
Pursuer wins if, at any time-step, the current position of the game belongs to the subset of final
positions. Of course this is exactly analogous to our capture set Sc.
A vertex labeling algorithm is also provided in [4]; it counts time in turns (not rounds) and
is essentially the same as our own VL Algorithm6. However, rather than proving directly the
properties of their algorithm, the authors proceed in the following manner.
1. The construct, independently of the labeling algorithm, a sequence of orderings 0, 1,
... on Pursuer and Evader positions.
2. They prove that these converge to an ordering .
3. They relate winning and “optimal” game duration to (i)i∈N0 and  (their Theorem 3.1
and Corollary 3.2).
4. Finally they relate state labels to the orderings (i)i∈N0 (Theorem 3.3)
Hence their vertex labeling algorithm is peripheral, rather than central to the arguments
of [4]. Nevertheless, the criticisms addressed to [7] can also be addressed to [4]. Namely,
“strategy”, “value” and “optimality” are used but not rigorously defined. An informal definition
of optimality is that an “the Pursuer’s optimal strategy is to move so that the game is over as
quickly as possible, and the Evader’s optimal strategy is to move so the game lasts as long as
possible”; similarly to [7], this definition does not clarify the role of the “other” player’s strategy.
A correct verbal description would be: “the Pursuer’s optimal strategy is to move so that the
longest possible duration of the game is as short as possible” (and a similar modification should
be appplied to the definition of the Evader’s optimal strategy). Now, the above are simply
verbal descriptions of the infσ1 supσ2 and supσ2 infσ1 conditions on capture time and they do not
suffice to ensure optimality (we must have in addition that infσ1 supσ2 equals supσ2 infσ1 , as in
Definition 2.16).
4.3 Berarducci and Intrigila
The earliest investigation of optimal CR strategies that we know of is the one presented in [1]
by Berarducci and Intrigila. As we will explain below, this work provides a very useful approach
to the CR problem.
Berarducci and Intrigila do provide a definition of strategies, both general and positional.
In their Remark 2.2 they apparently assume implicitly that an optimal solution can be found
by considering only positional strategies but they actually justify (post facto) this assumption.
Interestingly, the results of aspect of [1] are established by using a sequence of sets W0, W1,
... (rather than a labeling algorithm). The sequence is defined inductively: their W0 is our
capture sets Sc and, for each n, Wn is defined (their Definition 2.4) in a manner which strongly
resembles our VL Algorithm. The subsequent arguments (contained in their Lemmas 2.5-2.7)
resemble the analysis of our VL Algorithm. Their main results are the following.
6There is one caveat: it is never specified in [4] whether finitely labeled states can be changed by their
algorithm; this is probably an oversight in the description.
23
1. The set Wn is the set of all these starting states from which the Cop can capture the
Robber in n moves or less (their Lemma 2.5).
2. The sequence Wn converges to a state set W which has the following property: for every
starting state s ∈ W the Cop can capture the Robber in a finite number of moves; for
every starting state s /∈ W the Cop cannot capture the Robber in a finite number of moves
(their Lemma 2.6).
3. Optimal Cop and Robber strategies are also defined in the proof of Lemma 2.6 and they
are, by their definition, positional.
While in the above results Berarducci and Intrigila make no explicit mention of the “other
player’s” strategy, the use of “can” implies that the Cop has a strategy which guarantees capture
no matter how the Robber plays. Similarly, the use of “cannot” implies that the Robber has a
strategy which guarantees noncapture no matter how the Cop plays.
The proof of the above results is correct. In our understanding, the important quantities are
not the sets Wn but the sets Un = Wn\Wn−1. While not explicitly stated, it follows from their
proof that Un is the set of initial states from which
1. the Cop can capture the Robber in at most n rounds, no matter how the Robber plays ;
2. but the Robber can delay capture for at least n− 1 rounds, no matter how the Cop plays ;
In short, the analysis of [1] respects, at least implicitly, all the relevant game theoretic
considerations. It is also closely related to the previously mentioned vertex labeling algorithms.
For example, it is easy to prove that, reverting to our own terminology, the state s belongs to
Un iff T̂ (s) = n.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented two full game theoretic solutions of the GCR game. Let us briefly comment
on each one.
Our first solution, presented in Section 3.1, is self-contained and follows closely [7] and
[4]. The main tool for this solution is the VL algorithm which is based on similar algorithms
introduced in [7, 4]. Our main contribution in Section 3.1 is to present in greater detail and
precision certain implicit assumptions of [7, 4].
Our second solution, presented in Section 3.2, is also fully game theoretic but is not totally
self-contained (it invokes Von Neumann’s MinMax Theorem). It is also longer. The main reason
we have presented it is that it brings into the foreground certain aspects of the CR and GCR
game which are usually overlooked.
We conclude the current paper by listing (i) further generalizations of the GCR game and
(ii) well known families of games which contain GCR as a special case.
Generalizations of GCR. The GCR game, as presented in both [4] and the current paper is
a perfect information, two-person, zero-sum game. All of these aspects can be generalized.
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1. Concurrent GCR. A standard assumption of both classic CR and Bonato andMacGillivray’s
GCR is that a single player moves in each turn of the game. An obvious generalization is
to allow both players to move concurrently. In this case the game no longer has perfect
information. It still has a value which, however, will in genral be achieved by randomized
optimal strategies. An exploration in this direction appears in [10].
2. Nonzero-sum GCR. By modifying the payoff function we can obtain a two-player non-
zero sum CR game. For example, introducing “energy cost”, the Robber’s payoff could
be the capture time minus the distance he has traveled and the Cop’s payoff could be the
negative of the sum of capture time and the distance he has traveled. An example of a
two-player, nonzero-sum GCR game has been presented in [11]; it involves two selfish Cop
players who attempt to catch a “passive” robber; by “passive” we mean that the robber
is not controlled by a player but follows, instead, a predetermined path, known to both
cop players.
3. Multi-player GCR. Both the classic CR game and practically all its published variants
are two-player, zero-sum games; the same holds for the GCR of [4]. While such games
may involve more than one Pursuer, all Pursuers are controlled by a single player and
a single payoff function. On the other hand, in [12] we have studied an N -player (with
N ≥ 2), nonzero-sum version of the classic CR, the so-called Selfish Cops and Adversarial
Robber (SCAR) game. As the name indicates, SCAR involves several selfish cops, each
controlled by a separate player. All cop players share the goal of catching the robber but
each cop player has his own payoff function which assigns a higher reward to the player
who actually effects the capture; the robber player wants, as in the classic CR game, to
delay capture as long as possible. We have generalized this approach in [13], where we
have introduced N-player Generalized CR Games.
Additional Game Families
1. Stochastic Games . The above presented GCR games can be formulated and as stochastic
games. Using standard stochastic game results [9] it can be shown that:
(a) if they are zero-sum they possess a value and optimal strategies, which can be com-
puted by the Value Iteration Algorithm, a generalization of the VL algorithm pre-
sented in this paper;
(b) if they are nonzero-sum, they possess at least one Nash Equilibrium in deterministic
positinal strategies [12, 13].
2. Reachability games. The two-player, zero-sum GCR game (understood in the sense of
either the current paper or [4]) can also be seen as a special type of reachability game
[16, 2]. In a reachability game the first player’s objective is to bring the game to a target
state and the second player’s objective is to keep the game away from all target states. This
is very similar to the GCR game except that no assumption is made regarding the players’
locations. Indeed, a reachability game can be represented by a tuple (N, S1, S2, S) where
N represents an abstract collection of successor states. Our solution of the GCR game
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can be applied to any reachability game. However the “usual” way to solve a reachability
game is by constructing a sequence of attractor sets ; this approach is practically identical
to the one used in [1] to solve the classic CR game.
3. Graphical Games . Reachability games are perhaps the simplest example of infinite perfect
information games [2, 6, 16, 23] which can also be understood as games in which two
or more players move a token along the edges of a graph (hence the term “graphical
games”). Various infinitary winning conditions can be used which, in general, depend on
some property of the entire game history (for example: Player 1 wins if a certain state is
visited infinitely often). In the most general setting we can have games with any number
of players and nonzero-sum winning conditions.
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A Some Facts about Zero-Sum Games
All of the following definitions and propositions refer to a general two-player zero-sum game Γ
(i.e., they are not specific to the games we discuss in the main body of the paper). The game
is assumed to have a payoff to P 2 (the maximizer) equal to U (σ1, σ2) where σn is the strategy
used by P n (n ∈ {1, 2}); the payoff to P 1 (the minimizer) is equal to −U (σ1, σ2). Proofs can
be found in [15, 22].
Definition A.1 We define the following two quantities
lower value of Γ : U− (s) = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
,
upper value of Γ : U+ (s) = inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
.
Proposition A.2 We always have
U− = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
≤ inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= U+.
Definition A.3 We say that σ1 is minmax strategy (for P 1) iff
∀σ2 : U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= U+ = inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
.
We say that σ2 is maxmin strategy (for P 2) iff
∀σ1 : U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= U− = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
.
Proposition A.4 For every minmax strategy σ1 we have
∀σ1, σ2 : U
(
σ1, σ2
)
≤ sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
.
For every maxmin strategy σ2 we have
∀σ1, σ2 : U
(
σ1, σ2
)
≥ inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
.
Definition A.5 We say that Γ has a value Û iff
U− = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= U+.
in which case we define
Û = sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
.
Definition A.6 If Γ has a value Û and σ̂1 (resp. σ̂2) is a minmax (resp. maxmin) strategy,
then we call σ̂1 (resp. σ̂2) an optimal strategy for P 1 (resp. for P 2) and we also say that
(σ̂1, σ̂2) is an optimal strategy pair.
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Proposition A.7 Every finite (two player) zero-sum game has a value Û and an optimal strat-
egy pair (σ̂1, σ̂2), for which the following hold
Û = U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
= sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
.
Definition A.8 We say that (σ̂1, σ̂2) is a Nash Equilbrium (NE) of Γ iff
∀σ1 : U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
≤ U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
,
∀σ2 : U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
≥ U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
.
The next proposition says: (σ̂1, σ̂2) is an optimal strategy pair iff it is a Nash Equilbrium.
Proposition A.9 The following two conditions are equivalent.
U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
= sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
(C1)
∀σ1 : U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
≤ U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
and ∀σ2 : U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
≥ U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
. (C2)
Proof. To prove that C1 implies C2 we note that, since σ̂1 (resp. σ̂2) is optimal, it is also a
minmax (resp. maxmin) strategy. Hence from C1 we have
∀σ1, σ2 : U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
≤ sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
⇒ ∀σ2 : U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
≤ inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
,
∀σ1, σ2 : U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
≥ inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
⇒ ∀σ1 : U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
≥ sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
.
After rewriting (to improve clarity) we se that we have proved
∀σ2 : U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
≤ U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
,
∀σ1 : U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
≥ U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
,
which is C2.
To prove that C2 implies C1 we note [15, p.116, p.144][22, p.43] that we can rewrite C2 as
∀σ1, σ2 : U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
≤ U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
≤ U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
and then we have
sup
σ2
U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
≤ U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
≤ inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
⇒
inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
≤ sup
σ2
U
(
σ̂1, σ2
)
≤ U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
≤ inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ̂2
)
≤ sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
⇒
inf
σ1
sup
σ2
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
= U
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
= sup
σ2
inf
σ1
U
(
σ1, σ2
)
which is C1.
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